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A correlation analysis of the severity and certainty of punishment and offense rates for the major index crimes produces
results consistent with the predictions of deterrence theory.
Certainty of punishment proves to be the chief deterrent for
most crimes. Homicide, however, is influenced by severity, possibly reflecting the differences between homicide and other offenses. Little evidence of interaction is found between certainty
and severity in effects on crime rate. A power function proves to
better describe the relationship between the punishment variables and crime rates than a rectilinear equation-a conclusion
which, even apart from the date, appears more reasonable than
the reverse.
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efficacy of the death penalty in deterring capital offenses continues as one
of the liveliest debates of the century
(Bailey, 1973). Philosophers, theologians, legislators, and social scientists have joined in the deterrence
controversy.! Opinions on this issue

I. Discussions of deterrence are typically divided into two areas of concern: special deterrence and general deterrence. Special deterrence is concerned with reactions that the threat
of punishment produces among those who have been previously punished and who, for that
reason, may react to threats differently from the rest of the population. General deterrence
concerns the response the threat of punishment produces among persons who have not been
previously punished (Zimring, 1971). The concern of this paper is with the latter type of
deterrence. For an excellent review of deterrence theory and the distinction between special
and general deterrence, see Ball (1955), Andenaes (1966), and Zimring (1971).
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seem highly polarized. In the classical
criminological tradition, proponents
argue the absolute necessity of punitive sanctions to deter potential lawbreakers. Some even go so far as to
suggest that punishment and the fear
of punishment are the solution to the
entire crime problem. Witness, for
example, a statement by one of the
country's leading police officials in
addressing the police's understanding
of the crime problem:

continue to punish wrongdoers. Clearly, deterrence explanations of punishment are but "rationalizations of
revenge." No other justification is
possible (Barnes and Teeters, 1951).2

They alone know the answer to the
crime problem. That answer can be
summed up in one sentence-adequate
detection, swift apprehension, and certain,
unrelenting punishment. That is what
the criminal fears. That is what he understands, and nothing else, and that fear i~
the only thing which will force him into
the ranks of the law-abiding (Hoover,
1936).

Unfortunately, much of the deterrence debate has been of a philosophical or moral nature (Gibbs, 1968;
Puttkammer, 1953). Many have had
much to say on this issue, but few provide any evidence to support their
positions. "Moreover, much of the
evidence usually cited is inadequate
or inappropriate to the question at
issue" (Tittle, 1969, 41 0) and would
appear to have been collected for the
sole purpose of disproving the deterrent value claimed for punishment
(McClellan, 1961; Royal Commission
on Capital Punishment [1949-1953],
1955).

At the other extreme there are those
who see no hope whatsoever of punishing people into conformity. Positivist criminologists have been most
vocal in this respect. They argue that
an examination of the history of punishment clearly reveals its ineffectiveness in controlling crime. Barnes and
Teeters, for example, state:

In sum, despite the length and intensity of the deterrence controversy,
the role of punishment in deterring
crime remains obscure (Zimring and
Hawkins, 1973). This is an alarming
situation when considering that the
presumed effect of punishment provides the foundation of our criminal
justice system.

Not a single assumption underlying the
theory of capital punishment can be
squared with the facts about human
nature and social conduct that have been
established through the progress of science
and sociological thought in the last century and a half. In fact the whole concept
of capital punishment is scientifically and
historically on a par with astrological
medicine, the belief in witchcraft or the
rejection of biological evolution (1951,
355).
Despite this evidence, they add, we

PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Most deterrence research of the past
few decades has focused upon the relationship between homicide and capital punishment (Sellin, 1955, 1967;
Savitz, 1958; Schuessler, 1952; Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment
[I 949-1953], 1955). Investigations in
this area have been of two sorts. First,
historical analyses have been conducted comparing the incidence of
homicide before and after the aboli-

2. Equally negative, but less flamboyant, conclusions about punishment as a deterrent to
crime may be readily found in more recent criminology texts as well. See, for example,
Reckless (1973, 355), "it (punishment) does not prevent crime in others or prevent relapse
into crime."

CRIME AND DETERRENCE
126

tion or enactment of capital punishment. On an international scale such
investigations have usually concluded
that homicide rates and the death
penalty are independent of one another (Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment (1949-1953], 1955; Schuessler, 1952). Sellin's longitudinal investigation of states in this country
led him to a similar conclusion: "There
is no clear evidence in any of the
figures we have examined that the
abolition of capital punishment has
led to an increase in the homicide
rate, or that its reintroduction has led
to its fall" (1961, 70).
The second major source of evidence relating capital punishment and
homicide has come from comparisons
of abolitionist and capital punishment states' murder rates. These comparisons have revealed that the rate
of homicide is about two to three
times higher in capital punishment
than abolitionist states (Sutherland
and Cressey, 1970; Schuessler, 1952).
This is clearly contrary to what deterrence theory would predict. Some have
argued, however, that such comparisons are invalid, for the grouping of
these two types of states is not uniform
with respect to possible important
etiological factors; i.e., population
composition, social structure, and cultural patterns. To meet this objection,
Schuessler (1952) compared the homicide rates of capital punishment states
with their contiguous abolitionist
neighbors. This comparison revealed
that states' homicide rates are indifferent to the presence or absence of capital punishment statutes (Schuessler,
1952). Further, when the risk of execution in capital punishment states was
compared. with homicide rates, no
significant relationship was found "between a large number of executions,

small number of executions, continuous executions, no executions, and
what happens to the homicide rate"
(Sellin, 1961, 71 ).
In sum, it has generally been concluded from studies of capital punishment and homicide that the death
penalty is ineffective in deterring this
offense; and, further, that punishment
in general is ineffective in deterring
all offenses. Gibbs (1968) and Van
den Haag (1968) take issue with both
of these conclusions. First, most investigations of homicide and capital
punishment have been quite limited
in scope. Essential aspects of deterrence theory have been ignored in
these investigations. For example, fundamental to deterrence theory is the
celerity of punishment, although empirical examination of this factor is
completely absent in the literature. Second, past studies of deterrence have
typically focused upon one offensehomicide-and one form of punishment-the death penalty. These studies
tell us little if anything about the
deterrent properties of other forms of
punishment and other offenses. Obviously, general conclusions are not
warranted at this time (Zimring and
Hawkins, 1973).
Recent investigations have broadened the base of empirical evidence
on deterrence. Gibbs (1968) examined
the relationship between the severity
and certainty of punishment and
homicide rates for the states of this
country. He hypothesized that the
more certain and severe the penalties
for homicide in a state, the lower
the state's homicide rate would be.
Estimates of the severity and certainty
of punishment and offense rates were
constructed from official police and
prisoner statistics. 3 Examination of
these data revealed the relationship
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between severity and certainty of
punishment and offense rates to be
in the hypothesized inverse direction
(<{> = .25 and <f> = -.48, respectively),
with the larger coefficient between
certainty and rate "entirely consistent
with the position taken by practically
every advocate of deterrence theory"
(Gibbs, 1968, 525). In addition, Gibbs
also concludes that the combined effects of the severity and certainty of
punishment are additive in their effect on rates as deterrence theory
would predict.
A re-analysis of Gibbs's (1968) data
by Gray and Martin (1969) using a
more sophisticated statistical design
has led to some modifications of
Gibbs's findings. These researchers
examined Gibbs's data in its original
ratio scale form rather than simply
treating it as nominal as had Gibbs.
They 'further examined these data by
means of both a rectilinear and logarithmic statistical model. The latter
correlation model was utilized because some nonlinearity was apparent
in the data, and the power function
has the theoretical advantage of never
predicting negative crime rates, while
this is possible with a rectilinear
model.
Using a rectilinear model, Gray and
Martin found the correlation between

the severity and certainty of punishment and homicide rate to be in the
hypothesized inverse direction (r =
-.367 and r = -.281, respectively).
The corresponding log correlations
were also of a negative sign and somewhat larger (r = -.506 and r = -.379,
respectively). Where Gibbs found certainty of punishment to be the more
important factor, Gray and Martin
found the inverse to be true. Further,
a multiple correlation combining the
effects of the severity and certainty of
punishment on offense rates yielded
correlations (R = .442 for the linear
model, and R = -.599 for the logarithmic model) only slightly larger
than the respective largest zero order
correlations, thus only allowing an
increment in explained variation of
approximately .6 per cent and .9 per
cent, respectively. In sum, contrary to
Gibbs's (I 968) assertion, the severity
and certainty of punishment do not
appear to be additive in ·their effect on
homicide.
Tittle's (1969) deterrence investigation resembles quite closely the approach taken by Gibbs (1968). Utilizing police and prisoner statistics, he
examined the relationship between the
certainty and severity of punishment
and offense rates for seven major felonies.4 The correlation between esti-

3. Gibbs operationalized his certainty of punishment measure as the number of persons in
each state sent to prison for homicide in 1960, divided by the total number of homicides
reported to the police in that state for 1959-1960. The severity of punishment was operationalized as "the median number of months served on a homicide sentence by all persons
in prisons on December 31, 1960." The dependent variable was defined as the average annual
homicide rate per one hundred thousand population for each state from 1959-1961. The
average homicide rate for a three-year period was used to allow for sufficient time for the
deterrent effect and to provide greater stability to the rate.
4. Tittle operationally defined the certainty of punishment as the average number of admissions to prison for each of the index offenses in each state, from 1959 to 1962, divided by
the number of index offenses known to the police in each state, from 1958 to 1962. The
severity of punishment was operationalized as the mean number of months spent in prison
by index crime offenders released in 1960. Tittle's "Deviance Index" consisted of the mean
annual number of index offenses reported to the police in each state per 100,000 population
from 1959 to 1963.
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mates of the certainty of punishment
and offense rates for all seven offenses
combined was found to be in the
predicted direction (Tau c = -.45).
For the individual offenses the coefficients are: sex offenses= -.17; assault
= -.46; larceny = -.37; robbery =
-.36; burglary = -.31; homicide =
-.17; and auto theft = -.08. Like the
total crime index, each of these coefficients is in the hypothesized direction, and with the exception of those
for homicide and auto theft, are
highly significant (P<.OI ).
The relationship between the severity of punishment and offense rates
for all offenses combined was found
to be Tau c = .14. For the individual
offenses the correlations are: sex offenses = .26; assault = .18; larceny =
.14; robbery = .05; burglary = .14;
homicide = .45; and auto theft= .04.
With the exception of homicide these
findings are quite contrary to what
deterrence theory would predict.
In a recent investigation, Chiricos
and Waldo (1970) provide a further
examination of the hypothesis that
rates of crime are inversely related to
the certainty and severity of punishment. Like Tittle (1969), they examine the deterrence hypothesis for
each of the major index crimes, but

for three points in time.~ Further,
they examine the relationship between
changes in the level of the certainty
and severity of punishment and their
effect on offense rates. 6 As in Gibbs's
(1968) and Tittle's (1969) investigations, official police and prisoner statistics were used to construct punishment and rate indexes.
Examination of the certainty-rate
data revealed that all but one correlation was in the hypothesized negative direction. The strength and level
of significance of the associations
varied greatly by offense and over
time, however. Only for assault were
the two variables consistently and
significantly related for all three years.
For burglary, the relationships were
found to be statistically significant
for two years, while the remaining correlations were either low or not consistent by offense.
The severity-rate data also provided
no consistent support for the deterrence hypothesis. With one exception
(homicide, 1960), all correlations were
either positive or low negative. Moreover, little consistency over time was
exhibited within offense categories.
Examination of changes in the levels
of the severity and certainty of punishment and their effect on offense rates

5. Chiricos and Waldo's operationalization of the certainty and severity of punishment
is as follows:
19XX certainty = 19XX Admissions to Prison for "X" Offenses
Mean of "X" Crimes Known to Police in 19XX and 19XX
19XX severity= Median Length of Sentence Served by State Prisoners Released in 19XX
Crime rates were calculated on the basis of three year averages: mean of 1950, 1951, and 1952
rates; mean of 1960, 1961, and 1962 rates; and mean of 1963, 1964, and 1965 rates.
6. Chiricos and Waldo calculated changes in the levels of the severity, certainty, and offense
rates as follows:
19XX-19YY % Change in Certainty = (19YY certainty) -(19XX certainty)
19XX certainty
19XX-19YY % Change in Severity = (19YY severity)- (19XX severity)
19XX severity
19XX-19YY % Change in Rate = (19YY rate)- (19XX rate)
19XX rate
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also produced inconsistent findings.
Only approximately 4 per cent of
the certainty-rate correlations were in
the hypothesized direction and statistically significant, while none of the
severity-rate correlations was as hypothesized and statistically significant.
Chiricos and Waldo conclude that
their data provide little evidence of
deterrence. 7
In a final investigation of note,
Ehrlich ( 1972) also examines the hypothesis of a negative relationship between the severity and certainty of
punishment and offense rates for the
major index crimes for 1940, 1950, and
1960. Using punishment and rate indexes quite similar to those of the
above investigators, he reports a consistent negative correlation (r) between severity and rate, averaging
(1940-1960) as follows for each offense:
robbery = -.325; burglary = -.546;
larceny= -.287; auto theft= -.174;
murder = -.214; rape = -1.88; assault = -.389. 8 Similarly, the association between certainty and rate was
also found to be consistently in the
hypothesized direction with coefficients
averaging: robbery = -.913; burglary
= -.468; larceny = -.298; auto theft

= -.247; murder = -.466; rape =
-.578; assault = - .393.
In addition, Ehrlich also reports
that. when median family income, percentage of families below one half of
the median family income, and percentage nonwhite are introduced as
control variables (all three factors are
described by Ehrlich as "major theoretical determinants of criminal activity"), the relationship between punishment and rate remains generally
unchanged.9
In spite of the shortcomings of police and prisoner statistics used to
construct his punishment and rate indexes and the somewhat stringent econometric specification of functional
relationships required in the regression model used, Ehrlich (1972, 275)
concludes that his data are "consistent
with the hypothesis that law-enforcement activity has a deterrent effect on
offenders." Furthermore, the fact that
coefficients for crimes against persons
are not on the average lower than for
crimes against property suggests that
contrary to common belief, "law-enforcement activity may not be less
effective in combating crimes of hate

7. Chiricos and Waldo are reluctant, however, to suggest that the severity and certainty
of punishment fail to deter crime. Rather, they question whether deterrence may be adequately
addressed through the use of police and prisoner statistics.
8. Ehrlich operationalized his certainty of punishment measure as the number of persons
sent to prison in each state for each of the index crimes (1940, 1950, 1960), divided by the
number of index crimes reported to the police for these years. It is not clear whether Ehrlich
uses 'the mean or median length of sentence served by released felons as his measure of
severity, for he fails to reference the source of his prisoner data. He simply describes his
severity measure as the "average" length of prison sentence.
9. Although Ehrlich should be commended for introducing these three socio-economic variables into his investigation, it is unclear from his analysis how each of these factors individually, or in combination, affects the relationship between the severity and certainty of
punishment and offense rates. Unfortunately, he solely reports overall partial coefficients
between his punishment and rate variables, combining the effects of all three socio-economic
factors. A much more comprehensive picture might have been revealed had he reported
(a) zero order correlations between each of the independent variables and rate. (b) partial
coefficients between the punishment variables and rate, controlling for each socio-economic
factor, and (c) overall partial correlations between the independent and dependent variables,
controlling for the combined effect of all three socio-economic factors.
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and passion than crimes involving material gain" (274).
It is of interest to note the dissimilarity of Gibbs (1968), Gray and Martin (1969), Tittle (1969), Chiricos
and Waldo (1970), and Ehrlich's
(1972) findings on the question of
deterrence. These differences provide
a particular mystery considering the
similarity of the researcher's operationalizations of their punishment and
rate variables, and the time periods
examined. Clearly, further investigation would appear warranted.
THE PRESENT INVESTIGATION

The research reported here is a
further examination of the relationship between the severity and certainty of punishment and offense rates.
Our approach is similar to that of
Gibbs (1968), Tittle (1969), Chiricos
and Waldo (1970), and Ehrlich (1972),
with the following additions: first, police and prisoner data are examined
in their original ratio scale form, and
not simply dichotomized or trichotomized with a resulting loss in the
precision of the data. Second, the question of the additive effects of the
severity and certainty of punishment
on offense rates are examined for eight
index offenses. Third, the relationship
between the severity, cevtainty, and
offense rate variables are examined

by way of both a rectilinear and logarithmic statistical model for all
eight index crimes. 10 Lastly, each of
the above relationships is examined
over three points in time-1950, 1960,
and 1964.
In line with deterrence theory the
following hypotheses are advanced:
1. A substantial negative correlation exists between states' offense rates
and the severity of punishment for
each of the index offenses.
2. A substantial negative correlation exists between states' offense rates
and the certainty of punishment for
each of the index off.enses.
RESEARCH METHOD

In order to examine the above relationships, indexes were constructed
for the severity, certainty, and offense
rate variables. A discussion of these
indexes, the population under investigation, and the data ga-thering and
processing techniques used follow.

The Population
The population for this investigation consists of the states of the United
States. It was not possible, however, to
secure complete population data for
the three time periods chosen. For
1950, Michigan and Georgia failed to
report the prisoner data needed for
the severity 11 and certainty 12 indexes.

10. A discussion of the rectilinear and log statistical models will follow later in this paper.
ll. Severity data were gathered from the following sources:
1951 "National Prisoner Statistics: Prisoners Released from State and Federal Institutions,
1951." Washington, D.C.: 24-27.
1960 "National Prisoner Statistics: Characteristics of State Prisoners, 1960." Washington, D.C.:
69.
1964 "National Prisoner Statistics: State Prisoners: Admissions and Releases, 1964." Washington, D.C.: 52.
12. Police and prisoner statistics were used to construct the certainty of punishment measure.
The sources of these data are as follows:
Federal Bureau of Investigation
1950 "Crime in the United States: Uniform Crime Reports-1950." Washington, D.C.: 78-82.
1960 "Crime in the United States: Uniform Crime Reports-1960." Washington, D.C. 34-37.
1964 "Crime in the United States: Uniform Crime Reports-1964." Washington, D.C.: 50-53.
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For 1960, New Jersey failed to report
the needed data, as did New Jersey
and Alaska for 1964. This left a total
of 46 states for 1950, 47 states for 1960,
and 48 states for 1964. It is not possible at this time to say why these
prisoner data were not available for
the states and years mentioned. These
states are simply excluded from tables
reporting such data with a note stating, for example, "Excludes statistics
for Georgia and Michigan." Repeated
inquiries to the Federal Bureau of
Prisons about this matter have resulted in no explanation.

Measures
The Certainty of Punishment.The certainty-of-punishment measure
used consists of the number of admissions to state prisons for each of
the index offenses divided by the number of such crimes reported to the
police. This measure produced a certainty of punishment value for each
offense for the states and years designated above. This measure would appear as follows for the three time
periods designated:
Certainty

# admissions to prison for offense "X"
# of "X" crimes reported t0 the police
Official police and prisoner statistics
were used in the construction of this
measure.l 3
The above equation yields a cer·
tainty of punishment value which can
range theoretically from zero to one.
A value of zero would indicate that no

one was convicted and imprisoned for
the offense in question, while a value
of one would suggest that an equal
number of convictions and offenses
were reported. It should be kept clearly in mind that certainty estimates
cannot be interpreted as the proportion of offenders who are convicted
and imprisoned. Such data on individual offenders, while preferable, are
simply not available.
A second difficulty with this measure
was discovered when comparing number of prison admissions for various
offenses with the number of such offenses reported to the police. In some
instances, it was found that there were
more admissions to prison for an offense than there were such offenses
reported. That is, the numerator of
our certainty index was found to be
larger than the denominator, thus
yielding a certainty value greater than
unity. This situation could have occurred as a result of: (1) police departments in the states in question
underreporting the number of such
offenses; (2) prison authorities inaccurately reporting the number of
prison admissions for these offenses;
(3) plea bargaining (persons being
imprisoned for offenses other than
those reported by the police); (4) imprisonment of persons whose offenses
were committed and reported during
a previous year; or (5) any combination of these. In the 30 cases where
this situation occurred (1950 = 20,
1960 = 10, 1964 = 0) a certainty value
of .9999 was assigned.

Federal Bureau of Prisons
1950 "National Prisoner Statistics: Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions, 1950.'" Wash·
ington, D.C.: 72-73.
1960 "National Prisoner Statistics: Characteristics of State Prisoners, 1960.'' Washington, D.C."
16-18.
1964 "'National Prisoner Statistics: State Prisoners: Admissions and Releases, 1964." Wash·
ington. D.C.: 17.
13. The sources of these data are reported in note 12 supra.
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As indicated earlier, data were not
available for all states for some years.
In addition, complete prisoner data
were also not available for all states
for all offenses included in the analysis. In the tables where missing
prisoner data would normally be reported, one finds a dash (-). 14 It is
not clear what this dash means, for
there are no footnotes describing this
symbol. The same symbol appears elsewhere in Bureau of Prisons publications where frequencies are too small
(n< 10 or 12) to compute meaningful
averages. In the tables being considered here, however, we are dealing
with frequencies, and a small n size is
not a consideration. It would thus
appear that the dash (-) is used to
symbolize either (1) that no persons
were sent to prison in these states for
these offenses (a zero frequency), or
(2) that no data were reported by
these states on prison admissions for
these offenses and years. The first explanation seems more plausible, for
no zero frequencies are reported in
these data. Inquiry of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons as to the meaning of
this symbol (-) has received no satisfactory response to date. Consequently, 25 state-by-offense categories (13
for 1950, 8 for 1960, and 4 for 1964)
were omitted from the analysis.
A further difficulty with these data
centers in the problem of compara-

bility of offense categories. The index
offenses examined for 1950 include
murder, manslaughter, robbery, rape,
larceny, auto theft, burglary, and aggravated assault. Prisoner data for
1950 are comparable. For 1960 and
1964, however, no prisoner data are
reported for manslaughter or rape.
Consequently, these offenses were
omitted from the 1960 and 1964 analyses.u;
Three additional limitations of our
certainty measure should also be briefly noted. First, this measure is narrow
in scope. It refers solely to the certainty of imprisonment, ignoring other types of penalties. It should also be
kept in mind, however, that each of
the offenses considered here is a major felony, generally punishable by
at least one year in prison. Secondly,
our measure does not take into account the commission of multiple offenses by persons (Tittle, 1969) or
problems associated with "plea bargaining."
Third, because of delays between
arrest and trial, many persons arrested for an offense during any given
year may not be imprisoned (if convicted) until the following year. To
control for this time lag factor, it
would seem advisable to either (a)
compare offense rates for 1950, 1960,
and 1964 (the denominator of the
certainty index) with prison admis-

14. This symbol appears for the following offenses by year:
1950 manslaughter (3), auto theft (8), rape (2)
1960 auto theft (8)
1964 auto theft (8), larceny (I)
15. In addition, data from the Uniform Crime Reports for 1960 and 1964 exclude criminally
negligent manslaughter. This offense, however, is evidently included in prisoner homicide
data for these two years. Further, the assault categories for the prisoner and offense rate data
are not completely comparable. For 1960 and 1964, this offense was categorized for the prisoner
data as "assault." Offense rate data are available only for "aggravated assault" for these years.
Despite this discrepancy, this offense was left in the analysis. "Assault" data were used in the
numerator of our certainty equation, while "aggravated assault" data were used in the denominator. This would have the effect of escalating certainty values for this offense. This
would be a constant factor, however, for all states.
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sion figures for the following years,
1951, 1961, and 1965 (the numerator
of the certainty index) or (b) average
prison admission figures for 1950-51,
1960-61, and 1964-65 for the numerator
of our measure. In the absence of
comparable prison admission figures
for 1951, 1961, and 1965, however,
neither adjustment is possible. Accordingly, it must be assumed that the
carry-over of cases from year to year
between arrest and imprisonment is
a constant factor, thus not substantially biasing our certainty index.1 6
While it does suffer from the difficulties indicated, the certainty index
does reflect, although with error, the
relative certainty of punishment in
different states. Assuming the error
to be random relative to crime rates,
such error will only serve to attentuate
any "genuine" correlation between
certainty and rate.
The Severity of Punishment.-Severity of punishment is operationally
defined here as the median number
of months served in prison by released
felons. These data were obtained from
statistics published by the Federal
Bureau of Prisons for 1951, 1960, and
1964. This measure differs from that
used by Tittle (1969), who used the
mean length of sentence served (in
months) rather than the median. It
also differs from that used by Gibbs
(1968), who used the median number
of months served by felony prisoners
as of December 31, 1960.17 The me-

dian was used here because data comparable to either Gibbs's or Tittle's
were not available for all three time
periods.
Like the certainty of punishment
data discussed above, statistics on the
severity of punishment were also found
to be incomplete.1 8 First, severity figures (median length of sentence) were
not available for 1950. Apparently, the
Federal Bureau of Prisons did not
request these data from the states that
year. Severity data were compiled for
1951, however. These data were used
as an estimate of 1950 severity. It was
felt that these figures would provide
an adequate estimate for the former
year. Further, it was believed important to examine the severity-rate relationship over three rather than just
two points in time (1960 and 1964).
Second, like the certainty data, published severity statistics are incomplete. For 1951, 17 severity figures are
not reported. This resulted from the
fact that no prisoners were released
from prison in some states for these
offenses in 1951. Data were also missing for 1960 and 1964, when the
median length of sentence was not
reported for offense categories where
fewer than ten persons were released.
For 1960 and 1964 this amounted to
31 and 36 missing cases, respectively. 19
It was not possible to secure comparable severity data for 1959 or 1961, or
for 1963 or 1965, to calculate estimates
for these missing cases. 20

I6. For a discussion of two alternative measures of certainty ("clearance rate" and "arrest
rate") and the problems associated with each, see Zimring and Hawkins (1973, 330-335).
I7. See note 8 supra for a discussion of Ehrlich's severity index.
I8. See note II supra for the source of these data.
I9. Data were missing for the following offenses by year:
1960 homicide (9) , robbery (4) , assault (7) , larceny (4) , auto theft (7)
1964 homicide (11), robbery (4), assault (7), auto theft (14)
20. In addition, exact severity figures were not provided for offenses whose median severity
was over 180 months. These included 1960 homicide (2); 1964 homicide (8), robbery (3).
These offenses were assigned a value of 180 months.
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One final possible difficulty with
our severity of punishment measure
concerns the question of how well the
average length of prison sentence
served by released felons in 1951, 1960,
and 1964 reflects the courts' sentencing
practices for these years? That is, do
these figures provide a good indicator
of the length of prison sentence a felon
might expect if convicted during these
years? Unfortunately, in the absence
of adequate court statistics it is not
possible to directly test this question. 21
Inspection of figures in Table 1, however, indicates th<l't with the exception
of one offense (homicide), sentencing
practices were relatively constant for
the 14-year period considered here.
Again, unfortunately, comparable prisoner statistics for more recent years
(after 1964) are not available to test
whether this trend has continued.
TABLE

I

MEDIAN LENGTH OF PRISON SENTENCE
(MoNTHS) SERVED BY RELEASED fELONS, BY
YEAR AND OFFENSE

Offt!nse

19>.1 1960 1964

Murder ~nd Nonnt!gligent H~n3hughter

97

52

49

Robbery

.33

.31.:

36

hsau1t

2?

20

21

furghry

?2

20

?0

L~rceny

17

17

17

}uto Tht!ft

20

19

18

~ource:

See note 11.

Crime Rate: The Dependent Variable.-The dependent variable of this
investigation consists of each state's
crime rates for the offenses and years
specified above. Crime rate is here
defined as the number of offenses reported to the police per 100,000 population. These data were obtained from
the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
Uniform Crime Reports for 1950, 1960,
and 1964. 22 Rate figures were available for all states for each of the offenses and years selected.
Rate data were gathered for all
three time periods for homicide, robbery, burglary, assault, larceny, and
auto theft. In addition, for 1950, figures were also gathered for rape and
manslaughter. Comparable severity
and certainty data were not available
for these two offenses for 1960 and
1964, however.
Although FBI statistics have provided the most commonly used source
of data in deterrence investigations,
they are not without their faults. Most
notable of these concern problems of
incompleteness and comparability of
offense categories. At the one extreme,
there are those who view these difficulties as so serious as to preclude
their use in criminological investigations (Ahem, 1971). Most students of
crime, however, argue that the data
may not be good, but they are the best
we have for many purposes and may
be used very profitably if one keeps in
mind their limitations. For an excellent discussion and critique of the
Uniform Crime Reports, see Wolfgang, 1958, 1963; Beattie, 1960; Chilton, 1966; Lejins, 1966.23

21. The latest figures (1970) issued by the Federal Bureau of Prisons on released felons
cover only 33 of the 50 states. Furthermore, the form of the data reported does not permit
calculation of the median (or mean) length of sentence served in each state for each of the
major felonies (Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1970, 45-56) .
22. For the source of these offense rate data, see note 12 supra.
23. For a more detailed discussion of the problems of police statistics in conducting deterrence research, see Ehrlich (1972) and Zimring and Hawkins (1973).
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Data Processing and Analysis
The measures of association used
in this analysis are the Pearson product moment correlation (r) and multiple R. The only assumption neces·sary to use these measures is that one's
data reach at least an interval level
of measurement. This assumption
would appear warranted for our data.
Tittle (1969), Gibbs (1968), and
Waldo (1970) were not (apparently)
willing to assume their data were of
an interval level of measurement.
Gibbs, as we recall, utilized a conventional cp analysis, dichotomizing his
data at the median. He felt his data
did not meet the assumption of normality. Gray and Martin (1969) point
out that this assumption is not required in order to use r or R as a
measure of association, but only if
one is interested in using tests of significance in order to make a population
inference. Gibbs's data, as we recall,
were for all practical purposes population data. Some might argue that the
possible unreliability of police statistics does not allow an interval level
of measurement to be assumed. The
possible unreliability of police data is
not negated by reducing one's level
of measurement, however. In short,
the type of statistical design used by
Gibbs (1968), Tittle (1969), and Chiricos and Waldo (1970) results in a
substantial loss in the precision of the
punishment and rate data. 24

Alternative Models and
Decision-making
Gray and Martin (1969) found
that a power function relating severity
and certainty of punishment best explained Gibbs's (1968) homicide data.
The usual model in a correlation analysis of this kind is of the form Y =
A + Bx. Both a rectilinear and curvilinear correlation model will be examined here, for a single instance in
which the power function proves superior may be atypical.
The power function is expressed by
taking the logarithms of all three
variables and computing the conventional Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. The rectilinear
model is expressed by computing the
same correlation coefficients with the
raw data. The model with the higher
r value has the better fit for a particular set of data; that is, the rectilinear
model is the model of better fit if the
raw data produce higher coefficients
than the logarithmic data, while the
power function is the model of better
fit if the reverse occurs. 2'5
For various reasons conventional
"tests of statistical significance" are
not appropriate for these correlation
coefficients. Important assumptions required by the tests-most notably, independent random sampling-cannot
be met. 26 Consequently, we have arbitrarily chosen to regard as "large"
any coefficient whose absolute value

24. The statistical design used here has the further advantage over that used by Gibbs and
Tit·tle of being able to examine the simultaneous relationship between three or more variables,
interaction among variables, and the form of the relationship between variables.
25. In much correlation analysis in criminology it is uncritically assumed that the form of
the relationship between independent and dependent variables is linear and can best be
described with a straight regression line. Unfortunately this "rule of thumb" of linearity has
caused investigators to overlook the possible usefulness of alternative correlation models.
Recently, however, the linearity of relationships between punishment and rate variables in
deterrence research has been seriously questioned, with alternative (curvilinear) correlation
models being used quite profitably (Gray and Martin [1969], Bailey and Smith [1972]). For a
discussion of linear and nonlinear relationships in correlation analysis see any introductory
statistics text.
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exceeds .500 and as "moderate" any
coefficient between .400 and .500. Correlations whose value falls below .400
will arbitrarily be called "low."
RESULTS

Table 2 reports index correlations
between punishment variables and
crime rates. These correlations are
based on the assumption that the association between the variables is rectilinear in form.
TABLE

2

INDEX CoRRELATIONS BETWEEN PUNISHMENT
VARIABLES AND SELECTED OFFENSE RATES,

tions, for a total of eight correlations
which meet our criteria for further attention. All are negative, and all involve certainty. The probability of all
eight correlations having the same
sign (under the null hypothesis that
positive and negative correlations are
equally likely) is equal to 2(2·8 ), or
.008, thus rejecting the null hypothesis.
One additional coefficient, involving severity and homicide for 1950,
just meets our criterion for "moderate
correlation" when rounded to two
digits. The largest positive correlation
(between severity and auto theft for

BY YEAR

TABLE

LOG.
Punishm<>nt
Vari.:tble

Product Moment Correlations

.illQ_

.!J_§_Q_

19C·4

Homicide

Severity
Certainty
J.'fultiple

-.396
.120
.402

-.332
-.366
.450

-.165
-. 228
288

Robbery

Severity
Certainty
Multiple

-.125
-.446
.487

-.112
-.471
.480

-.068
-.338
.372

Assault

Severity
Certainty
Hultiple

.017
-.365
.374

.150
-.370
.370

.087
-.401
.415

Burglary

Severity
Certainty
Multiple

-.040
-.121
.148

.158
-.448
.449

271
-.527
.529

Severity
Certainty
Multiple

-.041
-.247
. 261

.191
-.377
.379

.105
-.450
.459

Severity
Ccrtcdnty
Multiple

-.086
-. 251

. 295
-.378
.426

.194
-.528
.532

Severity
Certainty
Multiple

-.144
-.153
.213

Severity
Certainty
Multi-ple

-.006
-.654
.654

Offen~..£

VARIABLES AND SELECTED OFFENSE RATES,
BY YEAR
Product-~1anl'!nt C'orr~l"tion:!!l

0

Punislunent

Theft

Auto Tbcft

Manslaughter

Rape

.262

V.c~riE:.'t!.£_

of Lop;11ri t.hm!!!
_llli_
...lliQ_

~

Homicide

Severity
Certainty
Multiple

-.044
.042
.058

-.415
-.349
-' 530

-.009
-.311
-.325

Robbery

Severity
Certainty
Hultiple

.002
-. 507
• 535

.020
-.499
.500

.122
-.639

Assault

Severity
Certainty
Multiple

.070
-.649
.687

.333
-. 704
.718

.308
-.615

Burglary

Severity
Certainty
?-lultiplc

-,094
.000
.102

.223
-.460
.460

291
-.524
.5'25

Severity
Certainty
Nulliple

.118

Theft

-.156
.181

.114
-.406
.418

.108
-.417
.424

Auto Theft

Severity
Certainty
Multiple

.158
-.051
.198

.191
-.490
.490

.113
-.650
.651

slaughter

Severity
Certainty
}lultiple

-.025
-.119
.124

RapP

Sevcl"ity
Certainty
Multiple

.080
-. 596
.601

0

We find that of the 40 correlations
presented, 27 three are large correlations and five are moderate correla-

3

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PUNISHMENT

M..1.n-

.687

0

6~8

0

26. Even though it is a common practice to use statistical tests of significance for "heuristic
value" even when their assumptions cannot be met, they will not be used here for two reasons:
(1) as noted above, for some years and offenses complete population data were not available,
and (2) the years selected for this analysis were not drawn on a probability basis, but rather
are the only years when reasonably complete data are available. Accordingly, population inferences become highly questionable.
27. The multiple correlations, being dependent on the severity and certainty correlations,
are not counted in comparing frequencies of positive and negative correlations or in testing
hypotheses of chance association.

.
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1960) is .295; while 14 negative correlations are of a larger absolute value.
Table 3 reports log correlations between punishment variables and crime
rates. These correlations are based on
the assumption that the association
between the variables takes the form
of a power function.
.Of the 40 correlations in Table 3,
eight are large and six are of moderate
size, for a total of 14 correlations
which meet our criteria of importance.
All are negative; one involving severity and 13 involving certainty. The
probability of all 4 correlations having the same sign (if positive and
negative correlations are equally as
likely) is equal to 2(2- 14), or .0001,
thus rejecting the null hypothesis.
DISCUSSION

It seems clear from the overwhelming negative trend of the larger correlations that these data give evidence
of deterrence. These results are consistent with those of Tittle (1969),
Gibbs (1968), Gray and Martin (1969),
and Ehrlich (1972), who also report a
substantial inverse relationship between their certainty and rate indexes.
They are not consistent with the conclusions of Chiricos and Waldo (1971),
however. Some possible reasons for the
discrepancy between Chiricos and
Waldo's findings and others have been
discussed elsewhere (Bailey et al.,
1972). It remains for us to examine
the problem of "spuriousness" commonly discussed in the literature, the
question of the form of relationship
between crime rates and the punishment variables, and the additivity of
effect of the punishment variables.

The "Spuriousness Issue"
Since all but one of our large and
moderate correlations involve certainty, it may be appropriate to ask whether they are artifacts of a commonfactor situation mentioned by Tittle
(1969) and emphasized by Chiricos
and Waldo (1971). The factor crimes
known to the police (hereinafter, C)
is the denominator of the certainty
ratio and the numerator of crime rate.
If we represent the situation algebraically, we have:
.

Certamty

I

= C

and Crime rate

C

= p

where I is the number of imprisonments and P is the population size. If
I, C, and P are independent, increases
in C will increase Crime Rate and decrease Certainty, while decreases in C
will do the reverse. Accidental fluctuations in C will thus tend to drive the
Certainty-Rate correlation in a negative direction.
This problem is especially severe for
Chiricos and Waldo (1971) for reasons based on their methodology. This
point has been discussed in detail
elsewhere (Bailey et al., 1972). It will
suffice for present purposes to say that
when product-moment correlation (r)
is used, the spurious "negative pressure" is relatively modest. The best
available estimate of this pressure is
probably Tittle's r of -.07 (r2 = .005),
which was computed from 1,000 cases
of random data, and because of this
large n is unlikely to be far off the
mark. 28 Because product-moment correlation capitalizes on chance, the pressure may be a bit greater for our n of
35-45, but the difference will be

28. If anything, Tittle's value would appear to be farther from zero than the true value.
His "data" were strictly random, while C, I, and P are actually interrelated; for an extreme
example, I cannot exceed P and C is very unlikely to.
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slight. 29 Accordingly, "negative pressure" seems unlikely to be responsible
for these results.
The Model of Choice

A special concern in this investigation is the question of the form of the
relationship between punishment variables and crime rates. The conventional rectilinear form is represented
in Table 2, while the power function
suggested by Gray and Martin (1969)
is represented in Table 3. A comparison of these tables provides an answer
to the question of which model better
fits the data.
In ll of the 14 cases where one or
both of the tables show a correlation
of moderate or large size, the larger
coefficient is found in Table 3. In
three cases, the larger coefficient is
found in Table 2. 30 Under the null
hypothesis that the larger coefficient
is equally likely to be found in Table
2 or Table 3 (both .5), the binomial
probability of an outcome this evenly
divided, with direction predicted, is
I

+

14

+ 91 + 364
214

470
16384

= '029

That is, the null hypothesis may be
rejected, indicating that the power
function better fits the data.
The power function has attractive
features apart from its greater ability
to account for the variation in offense
rates. Its predictions make intuitive
sense in that it predicts proportional
changes in crime rates from proportional changes in punishment variables and does not predict such absurdities as negative crime rates. Power functions have also been asserted
to be the established form for psychophysical relationships (Stevens,
1970) and there is some intuitive harmony in their also being appropriate
for the social psychology of deterrence.
At the same time, we should recognize
that a large number of other classes
of functions remain unexplored.a1
Additivity of Effect: Certainty
and Severity

Figures in Tables 2 and 3 give little
evidence that the combined effects of
the severity and certainty of punishment provide a greater deterrent value
than that of certainty alone. In each
table, there are only I 0 instances in

29. If one adds the r' associated with the largest positive correlation to the r' associated
with Tittle's-.07, the sum is less than the r' associated with the smallest negative correlation.
This holds even if one doubles the magnitude of Tittle's correlation (thus quadrupling the
r") . For example, from Table 3:
Largest positive correlation
.333 (r2
.ll09)
Double Tittle's correlation
-.14 (r2
.0196)
Sum of determination coefficients = .1305
A similar result holds for Table 2. To the extent that the "negative pressure" is fairly repre·
sented by a product-moment r as much as twice that reported by Tittle, it seems reasonable
to proceed as we have done.
For both index and log correlations, the smallest "moderate" correlation represents a coefficient of determination which exceeds the coefficient of determination associated with the
largest positive correlation by more than the "spurious negative pressure."
30. These three cases included one in which the values differed by .003; we considered
regarding them as tied, but decided that the conservative procedure would be to include the
case.

=
=

=
=

31. For a discussion of the possible nonlinearity of the relationship between the severity
and certainty of punishment and offense rates, see Zimring and Hawkins (1973), Andenaes
(1966), and Bailey and Smith (1972).
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which the combined effect of both
punishment variables (R) exceeds the
larger of the zero-order correlations by
.01 or more. 32 That is, half the comparisons involve less than .01 difference between the larger zero-order correlation and the multiple correlation.
Of the four cases where the multiple
correlation exceeds the larger of the
zero-order correlations by .05 or more,
all involve homicide; three (two in
Table 2 and one in Table 3) involve
murder, while one (in Table 2) involves manslaughter. In all four cases
both the severity-rate and certaintyra-te correlations are negative. The
more frequent cases, where there is
little difference between the larger
zero-order correlation and the multiple
correlation, typically involve a negative correlation between certainty and
rate and a small positive correlation
between severity and rate.
We are thus inclined to conclude
that the certainty of punishment has
a dominant effect except for homicide
and that the severity of punishment is
related to crime rate largely as a result
of its correlation with certainty. With
modern indeterminate sentences, the
offender may be relatively unable to
guess the severity of his sentence until
his sentence ends, for it may depend
more on his behavior behind bars than
on his offense. If this should be the
case, severity could hardly figure importantly in deterrence. Homicides,
however, more often lead to long minimum sentences, with authorities reluctant to release murderers soon after
imprisonment.

Presence of Deterrence

From the above, it seems clear that
the dominant variable in deterrence
(of those examined here) is certainty.
The most common pattern in both
Tables 2 and 3 involves a strong or
moderate negative correlation between
certainty and crime rate, a weak correlation (usually positive) between
severity and crime rate; and a multiple
correlation between crime rate and
the two punishment variables that is
roughly equal to the larger zero-order
correlation. Exceptions to this rule are
more likely to involve a negative correlation between severity and crime
rate. The most striking of these exceptions involves homicide.
It seems fair to conclude that both
Gray and Martin (1969) and Tittle
( 1969) are correct about the effect of
severity. Severity has an important
effect upon homicide, but for most
crimes it is relatively unimportant.
Homicide appears to be a case unto
itself, which seems sociologically
reasonable for homicide is structurally
unlike other crimes.aa

Homicide is directed at a particular
victim and usually results from interpersonal stress. The murderer is especially limited to one victim (while
the thief may choose among many).
The murderer may be seen as one who
has "decided," however hastily, that
the strain of tolera·ting a particular
victim is worse than the risk of punishment. He cannot choose the victim
or the jurisdiction least likely to result in imprisonment, as the thief and
even the rapist can choose. It is there-

32. We refer, of course, to differences between absolute values.
33. Rape is sometimes classed as similar to homicide, but follows roughly the "standard"
pattern in these data. See, e.g., Ploscowe (1968) and Svalastoga (1962). The similiarities
between aggravated assault and homicide have also been noted, but the assault data also
follow roughly the "standard" pattern. See, e.g., Pittman and Handy (1964).
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fore not surpnsmg that while other
offenders may be deterred by the
serious risk of imprisonment, the person who kills is influenced by the
severity of sentence at risk.
SUMMARY

A correlation analysis of the severity
and certainty of punishment and offense rates for the rna jor index crimes
produced results consistent with the
predictions of deterrence theory.
There were, however, many instances
in which the predicted evidence of
deterrence was absent. We are thus
inclined to regard these findings as
possibly reflecting a multiplicity of
political and legal differences in the
handling of crime data and offenders
which sometimes obscure the relationship between the punishment and rate
variables.
Our results indicate that certainty
and not the severity of punishment is
the chief deterrent for most crimes.34
Homicide, however, is influenced by
severity, possibly reflecting the differences between homicide and other
offenses. Further, it appears that a
power function better describes the
relationship between the punishment
variables and crime ra,tes than a
rectilinear equation-a conclusion

which, even apart from the data,
appears more reasonable than the reverse.
As noted above, the difficulties in
using official police and prisoner data
to study deterrence precisely are many.
We are thus inclined to conclude that
while research of the present kind is
important in establishing that a
process (deterrence) is occurring, its
exact nature may be better addressed
by an alternative methodological approach. Fundamental to deterrence
theory is the notion that potential
offenders' perceptions of the probability of detection and the punishment that would result-no matter
how mistaken-are the key mechanisms of deterrence. Accordingly, social
psychological investigations of deterrence such as those suggested by limring and Hawkins (1968, 1973),
Waldo and Chiricos (1972), Bailey
et al., (1970), and Zimring (1971),
focusing on how perceptions of the
severity, certainty, and celerity of
punishment relate to criminal behavior and how would-be offenders
come to form perceptions of the
probability and nature of punishment, would seem particularly fruitful. Research of this sort is currently
under way by the present writers.

REFERENCES

Ahern, James F.
1971
Police In Trouble, New York, Hawthorn Books.
Andenaes, Johs
1966
"The General Preventive Effects of Punishment," University of Pennsyl·
vania Law Review, 114, 949-983.
34. Deterrence advocates agree that if punishment is to act as an effective deterrent it must
be administered swiftly. Studies of the celerity of punishment for both capital and noncapital
offenses are completely absent from the empirical literature, however.

CRIME AND DETERRENCE
141
Bailey, William C.
1973
"Murder and Capital Punishment: Some Further Evidence," paper presented at the annual American Sociological Association Meetings, New York.
Bailey, William C., Louis N. Gray, and J. David Martin
1972
"On Punishment and Crime (Chiricos and Waldo): Some Methodological
Commentary," Social Problems, 19 (Fall), 284-289.
Bailey, William C. and Ronald W. Smith
1972
"Punishment: Its Severity and Certainty," journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 63 (December) 530-539.
Ball, John
1955
"The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and Law," journal of Criminal
Law, Criminology and Police Science, 46 (September October), 347 354.
Ball, Richard A.
1969
"Why Punishment Fails," American journal of Corrections, 31, (JanuaryFebruary): 19-21.
Barnes, Harry E. and Negley K. Teeters
1951
New Horizons in Criminology. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Bazelon, David L.
1960
"The Imperative to Punish." Atlantic Monthly 206 (July): 41·47.
Beattie, Ronald H.
1960
"Crime Statistics in the United States," journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 51, (May-June) 49-56.
Bedau, Hugo A.
1970
"Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Reconsideration," journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 61 539-548.
"The Death Penalty in America," Federal Probation, 35, No. 2, 32-43.
1971
Campbell, Donald T. and Lawrence H. Ross
1968
"The Connecticut Crackdown on Speeding: Time-Series Data in Quasiexperimental Analysis," Law and Society Review 3 (August) , 33-53.
Chambliss, William J.
1966
"The Deterrent Influence of Punishment," Crime and Delinquency 12
(January) 70-75.
"Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions," Wisconsin
1967
Law Review (Summer), 703-719.
Chilton, Ronald J.
1966
"Persistent Problems in Crime Statistics." paper presented at the annual
American Sociological Association Meetings, Miami, Fla.
Chiricos, Theodore and Gordon Waldo
1970
"Punishment and Crime: An examination of Some Empirical Evidence,"
Social Problems 18 (Fall): 200-217.
Clark, Gerald
1969
"Black Tuesday in Montreal: What Happens When the Police Strike," Time
Magazine (Nov. 16), 45££
Clark, John P. and Larry L. Tifft
1966
"Polygraph and Interview Validation of Self-reported Deviant Behavior,"
American Socilogical Review 31 (August): 516.
Ehrlich, Isaac
1972
"The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement," The journal of
Legal Studies, 1, No. 2, 259-276.
Federal Bureau of the Census
1945
Judicial Criminal Statistics. Washington, D.C.

CRIME AND DETERRENCE

142
Federal Bureau of Investigation
1950
Crime in the United States: Uniform Crime Reports-1950. Washington,
D.C.
Crime in the United States: Uniform Crime Reports-1960. Washington,
1960
D.C.
1964
Crime in the United States: Uniform Crime Reports-1964. Washington,
D.C.
Federal Bureau of Prisons
1950
National Prisoner Statistics: Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions,
1950. Washington, D.C.
1951
National Prisoner Statistics: Prisoners Released from State and Federal
Institutions, 1951. Washington, D.C.
National Prisoner Statistics: Characteristics of State Prisoners, 1960. Wash1960
ington, D.C.
1963
National Prisoner Statistics: Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions,
1963. Washington, D.C.
1964
National Prisoner Statistics: State Prisoners: Admissions and Releases, 1964.
Washington, D.C.
1970
National Prisoner Statistics: State Prisoners: Admissions and Releases, 1970.
Washington, D.C.
Gibbs, Jack P.
1968
"Crime, Punishment and Deterrence," Social Science Quarterly 48 (March) :
515-530.
Gray, Louis N. and J. David Martin
1969
"Punishment and Deterrence: Another Analysis of Gibbs' Data," Social
Science Quarterly 49 (September): 289-295.
Hoover, J. Edgar
1936
"Patriotism and the War against Crime." An address given before the
annual convention of the Daughters of the American Revolution, Washing·
ton, D.C., April 23.
Jensen, Gary F.
"Crime Doesn't Pay: Correlates of Shared Misunderstanding," Social Prob1969
lems 17 (Fall), 189-201.
Lejins. Peter P.
1966
"Uniform Crime Reports," Michigan Law Review, 64 No. 6 (April): 1001.
1030.
McClellen, GrantS. (ed.)
1961
Capital Punishment. New York: H. W. Wilson.
Menninger, Karl
1968
"The Crime of Punishment," Saturday Review (Sept. 7): 21-55.
Pitman, David J. and William Handy
1964
"Patterns in Criminal Aggravated Assault," journal of Criminal Law,
Criminology and Police Science, 55 (December): 462-470.
Ploscowe, Morris
"Rape." Pp. 203-240 in E. Sagarin and D. J. MacNamara (eds.), Problems
1967
of Sex Behavior. New York: Crowell.
Reckless, Walter C.
The Crime Problem. 2nd Edition. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
1973
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-1953)
Report. Great Britain Parliament. (Papers by command, MD. 8932.) Sep·
1955
tember. London: H.M. Stationery Office.

CRIME AND DETERRENCE
143
Savitz, Leonard D.
1958
"A Study of Capital Punishment," journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 49 (November-December): 338-341.
Schuessler, Karl
1952
"The Deterrent Influence of the Death Penalty," Annals 284 (November):
54-62.
Sellin, Thorsten
1955
Quoted in pp. 17-24 in Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (19491953). Report. Great Britain Parliament. (Papers by command, MD. 8932)
September, London: H. M. Stationery Office.
1961
Quoted in pp. 70-71 in Grant S. McClellan (ed.), Capital Punishment.
New York: H. W. Wilson.
Stevens, S. S.
1970
"Neural Events and the Psychophysical Law," Science 170 (4 Dec.) 10431050.
Sutherland, Edwin H. and Donald R. Cressey
1970
Principles of Criminology. 7th Edition. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott.
Svalastoga, Kaare
1962
"Rape and Social Structure," Pacific Sociological Review 5 (Spring) : 48-53.
Thorsell, Bernard A. and Lloyd W. Klemke
1972
"The Labeling Process: Reinforcement and Deterrent," Law and Society
Review 6 (February) , 393-403.
Tittle, Charles R.
"Crime Rates and Legal Sanctions," Social Problems 16 (Spring): 409-423.
1969
van den Haag, Ernest
1968
"In Defense of Punishment," Fortune Magazine 78 (December): 203-204.
Waldo, Gordon and Theodore Chiricos
1972
"Perceived Penal Sanction and Self-Reported Criminality: A Neglected
Approach to Deterrence Research," Social Problems 19 (Spring): 522-540.
Wilson, James Q.
"If Every Criminal Knew He Would Be Punished If Caught," New York
1973
Times Magazine (Jan. 28): 9, 44, 52-55.
Wolfgang, Marvin E.
1958
Patterns of Criminal Homicide. New York: John Wiley.
1963
"Uniform Crime Report: A Critical Appraisal," University of Pennsylvania
Law Review, Ill (April): 708-738.
Zimring, Franklin E.
1971
Perspectives on Deterrence. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office.
Zimring, Frank and Gordon Hawkins
1968
"Deterrence and Marginal Groups," journal of Research in Crime and
Delinquency 5 (July) : 100-114.
1973
Deterrence: The Legal Threat in Crime Control. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.

